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Abstract 
What is scientific progress? On Alexander Bird’s epistemic account of scientific 
progress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is more 
scientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using 
Bird’s epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative 
understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive 
precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more 
aspects of the world at the end of the episode than at the beginning. This 
account is shown to be superior to the epistemic account by examining cases 
in which knowledge and understanding come apart. In these cases, it is argued 
that scientific progress matches increases in scientific understanding rather 
than accumulations of knowledge. In addition, considerations having to do 
with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor 
this understanding-based account over its epistemic counterpart. 
 
Introduction 
Although it is nearly uncontroversial that science makes progress of some sort or 
other, it is far from uncontroversial what scientific progress consists in. Historically, 
scientific progress has often been associated with advances in scientific knowledge, e.g. 
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by Francis Bacon (1620/1900), George Sarton (1927), and William Bragg (1936). 
More recently, Alexander Bird (2007, 2008, forthcoming) has defended an influential 
version of this view, the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science 
constitutes progress precisely when there is more scientific knowledge at the end of the 
episode than at the beginning.1 Using Bird’s epistemic account as a foil, this paper 
develops an understanding-based account of scientific progress and argues that it is 
superior to the epistemic account. On this view, an episode in science is progressive 
precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the 
world at the end of the episode than at the beginning. I will refer to this as the noetic 
account of scientific progress.2,3 
 My arguments for preferring the noetic account over the epistemic account are 
primarily concerned with two classes of cases in which the accounts give conflicting 
verdicts about whether scientific progress has been made. On the one hand, I locate a 
class of cases in which there is an increase in scientific understanding even though no 
                                                
1 Other contemporary proponents of the epistemic account include Barnes (1991) and Cohen (1980). 
2 ‘Noetic’ as in the Greek ‘nous’, which is often translated into English as ‘understanding’. 
3 Those that come closest to defending something like the noetic account of scientific progress in the 
contemporary literature are Sorin Bangu (2015) and Angela Potochnik (2015). Bangu argues that Bird’s 
epistemic account should be supplemented with the suggestion that progress can be made by unifying 
scientific theories, where such unification constitutes increased understanding on his view. Relatedly, 
Potochnik suggests that one aim of science consists in giving idealized explanations that contribute to 
understanding of the explained phenomena. Although Potochnik is concerned with the aim of science 
as opposed to scientific progress, we shall see (in section 2) that there is a straightforward way in which 
views about the aim of science translate into views about scientific progress. 
I lack the space here to discuss Bangu’s and Potochnik’s views in detail. Suffice it to say that 
both views differ in key respects from the account defended in this paper: First of all, both of these views 
employ conceptions of understanding that differ substantially from the one I will use in this paper (see 
section 1). Bangu’s and Potochnik’s views are also considerably less ambitious, in effect claiming only 
that increasing understanding is one way for science to make progress. Indeed, Bangu and Potochnik 
do not argue that the kind of understanding they are interested in does not reduce to scientific 
knowledge, in which case their views would be entirely compatible with the epistemic view. Finally, the 
motivations for these views are very different from the arguments given in this paper. 
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new theories or phenomena become known in the process. On the other hand, I also 
locate a class of cases in which knowledge is accumulated but there is no increase in 
scientific understanding. In both cases, I argue that scientific progress matches 
increases in scientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. In 
addition, considerations having to do with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, 
and epistemic value all favor the noetic account over its epistemic counterpart. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 clarifies the issue at hand and 
briefly surveys accounts of scientific progress in the contemporary literature. Section 2 
spells out the noetic account by specifying what kind of understanding the noetic 
account is concerned with and shows how understanding, so conceived, differs from 
knowledge. Sections 3 and 4 argue that the noetic account is superior to the epistemic 
account by examining two classes of cases in which the epistemic account and the 
noetic account offer conflicting verdicts about whether scientific progress has been 
made. Section 5 responds to concerns that achieving increased understanding is either 
too easy, or too hard, for it to constitute scientific progress. Section 6 briefly considers 
some further advantages of the noetic account of scientific progress over the epistemic 
account. Section 7 is the conclusion. 
 
1. Scientific Progress  
In general, an episode can be said to be progressive when the state of affairs at the end of 
the episode is an improvement on the state of affairs at the beginning. However, 
accounts of scientific progress are not meant to capture all kinds of progress, not even 
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all kinds of progress that concern changes in the scientific enterprise. 4  Rather, 
accounts of scientific progress concern the kind of cognitive progress that roughly 
consists in improving the ways in which science represents the world. For example, 
cognitive progress was made when Einstein’s theories of special and general relativity 
replaced Newtonian mechanics, and also when the latter replaced the mechanical 
principles developed by Galileo and Descartes. Similarly, cognitive progress was made 
when Eddington’s plum-pudding model of the atom was superseded by Rutherford’s 
planetary-orbit model, which in turn was superseded by Bohr’s quantum-mechanical 
model. Since the sort of progress that I will be discussing in this paper falls quite 
clearly under cognitive progress, I will not in this paper give a precise definition of 
‘cognitive progress’ or distinguish it from other non-cognitive kinds of progress (in 
science or elsewhere). Indeed, in what follows I will use the term ‘progress’ as 
shorthand for ‘cognitive progress’. 
It is worth noting that the question of what constitutes scientific progress is 
closely related to the long-standing debate between scientific realists and anti-realists 
about the aim of science. Roughly following Bird (2007) and Niiniluoto (2015), this 
relationship can be described as follows: 
(A) X is the aim of science just in case science makes progress when X 
increases or accumulates.5 
So, on the epistemic account, science aims to give us knowledge of the world, whereas 
on the noetic account science aims to enable us to understand the world.6 We could 
                                                
4 On this point, see Niiniluoto (2015: §2.1). 
5 Those who think science has more than one (cognitive) aim may replace ‘the’ with ‘an’ in (A). 
6 Thus, in so far as van Fraassen (1980) is correct to define scientific realism and anti-realism in terms of 
whether science aims at its theories being true or merely empirically adequate, these accounts amount 
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supplement (A) by adding that science promotes progress precisely when it promotes the 
increase or accumulation of X, where X is the aim of science.7 Clearly, promoting 
scientific progress is itself very valuable, almost as valuable as progress itself. 
Nevertheless, since nearly anything can promote progress, we must be careful not to 
confuse scientific progress itself with the promotion of such progress. For example, 
technological advances, increased funding for scientific research, and hunches about 
how a problem might be solved, all promote progress in typical cases although they 
presumably do not themselves constitute (cognitive) scientific progress. So promotion 
of progress is not necessarily itself progress. We will return to this point in section 5, 
where I will argue that collecting raw data is sometimes best characterized as 
promoting (as opposed to constituting) scientific progress. 
  This paper focuses on two accounts of scientific progress (thus understood), 
Bird’s (2007, 2008, forthcoming) knowledge-based epistemic account and my own 
understanding-based noetic account. I won’t be concerned here, except in a derivative 
way, with other accounts of scientific progress in the current literature. Of alternative 
accounts, two are most prominent: the verisimilitudinarian account and the problem-solving 
                                                                                                                                       
to two distinct realist views of the aim of science. To see this, consider the epistemic account first: Since 
knowledge is factive, the epistemic account entails that science aims for truth as well as for other 
components of knowledge (e.g. epistemic justification). Hence the epistemic account amounts to a 
strongly realist view on van Fraassen’s conception of scientific realism. Whether the noetic view also 
counts as realist will depend on whether understanding, like knowledge, is factive. In section 2, I will 
suggest that understanding is quasi-factive – roughly in the sense that the explanatorily/predictively 
essential elements of a theory must be true in order for the theory to provide grounds for 
understanding.  Thus conceived, the noetic account amounts to a moderately realist view of the aim of 
science. Specifically, the noetic account entails that the aim of science may be satisfied by theories that 
distort some aspects of reality, e.g. idealizations such as the ideal gas law, provided that the distortions 
introduced by such theories facilitate explanations and/or predictions (we will return to this issue in 
section 6). So, while the noetic account holds that science does not merely aim for empirically adequate 
theories, it also recognizes that the aim of science may be satisfied by theories that are not completely 
accurate descriptions of reality. 
7 Bird (2007: 83-84) also characterizes the connection between scientific progress and the aim of science 
in terms of promotion, but in a different way than I do here. More on this in section 5. 
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account. According to the verisimilitudinarian account, science makes progress when its 
theories come closer to the truth, i.e. when their ‘verisimilitude’ increases (Popper 
1963, 1979; Niiniluoto 1980, 2014). The problem-solving account, by contrast, holds that 
science makes progress by increasing its capacity for solving empirical and conceptual 
problems in a way that is recognizable by the scientific practitioners themselves (Kuhn 
1970; Laudan 1977, 1984). Both of these accounts raise important and mostly distinct 
issues that cannot be adequately dealt with in this paper. Thus a systematic 
comparison of these accounts with the noetic account will have to await another 
occasion. 
 Although the idea that scientific progress should be associated with 
understanding is rarely discussed in the literature on scientific progress,8 related ideas 
did surface in discussions of scientific explanations in the latter half of the previous 
century. In particular, Scriven (1962), Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981, 1989) 
argued that an adequate account of explanation must show how explanations produce 
                                                
8 As we will see, Bird (2007: 84) briefly discusses the idea that scientific progress consists in increasing 
understanding, but takes it to be compatible with his epistemic view (I will argue differently below). 
Other than Bird, Bangu (2015) and Potochnik (2015) are the only other authors of which I am aware 
who (explicitly or implicitly) associate scientific progress with scientific understanding in a sense similar 
to that in which I will be using the term – see footnote 3. 
It may be worth noting, however, that earlier discussions of scientific progress include a 
proposal by Finocchiaro (1975, 1976) to supplement Laudan’s problem-solving account of scientific 
progress with the idea that progress may consist in increasing the intelligibility of the theoretical 
concepts used in solving scientific problems. Finocchiaro refers to this process as “growth of 
understanding”. However, as I explain in section 2 below, the kind of understanding that I will argue 
increases as science makes progress is concerned with understanding natural phenomena as opposed to 
theoretical concepts, and should therefore not be confused with conceptual intelligibility of the kind 
that interests Finocchiaro. Moreover, the kind of understanding which I argue increases when science 
makes progress is necessarily based on substantially correct theories – a requirement that Finocchiaro 
(1975: 126) explicitly eschews, in line with Laudan’s problem-solving approach in which scientific 
progress is wholly dissassociated from external criteria such as truth (more on this in section 3). Thus, at 
least for the purposes of this paper, Finocchiaro’s view counts as a version of the problem-solving 
account of scientific progress as opposed to understanding-based views such as the noetic account. (I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to Finocchiario’s work on this topic.) 
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understanding – a point that Friedman and Kitcher famously took to count in favor of a 
unificationist account of explanation.9  In contrast to Scriven, Friedman and Kitcher, 
my interest is not with the relationship between understanding and explanation, but 
with how understanding relates to scientific progress. Although I do take 
understanding to be closely related to explanation, I will not be presupposing a 
unificationist account of explanation in what follows, nor will I assume that 
understanding always involves unification. Indeed, as we shall now see, my conception 
of understanding is not only broad enough to be compatible with any specific account 
of explanation, but also allows for understanding to increase by means other than 
explanations.10 
 
2. Scientific Understanding 
As advertised above, I will argue that the understanding-based noetic account of 
scientific progress is superior to the knowledge-based epistemic account. In arguing for 
this, I assume that it is possible for there to be increases in scientific understanding 
without accumulations of scientific knowledge, and vice versa. This section outlines a 
conception of understanding on which this assumption holds. Outlining this 
                                                
9 For a more recent unificationist account of explanation that particularly emphasizes the role of 
understanding, see (Schurz and Lambert 1994; Schurz 1999); for detailed criticism of this proposal, see 
(Gijsbers 2007; 2013). Although the emphasis on understanding in relation to scientific explanation has 
generally been stronger among those who adopt unificationist theories of explanation, it is worth noting 
that Wesley Salmon, a long-time proponent of a causal theory of explanation (Salmon 1984), also 
emphasized the centrality of understanding in thinking about scientific explanations, especially in his 
later work (e.g., Salmon 1993, 1998: ch. 5). Interestingly, however, Salmon explicitly allowed for the 
existence of non-causal explanation (and thus non-causal understanding) in his more recent work (e.g., 
Salmon 1989: 183-184, 1998: 73-78). 
10 For arguments that scientific understanding and explanation can come apart, see (Lipton 2009) and 
(Gijsbers 2013). 
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conception also serves to specify in what sense the noetic view takes scientific progress 
to consist in increasing scientific understanding.  
Let me note at the outset, however, that this conception of scientific 
understanding will not be uncontroversial. Indeed, there are many competing views of 
the nature of understanding in the current literature, some of which conceive of 
understanding as a species of knowledge.11 While I agree with a number of other 
authors that knowledge-based conceptions of understanding are inadequate,12 I will 
not rehearse the arguments for that here. Rather, since my concern here is with the 
nature of scientific progress as opposed to the nature of understanding per se, I am 
happy to adopt a stipulative definition of ‘scientific understanding’ for the purposes of 
this paper. So, while I do think that my definition is plausible and independently 
motivated, readers need not agree with it in order to accept my arguments against the 
epistemic account and in favor of the alternative noetic account. 
To a first approximation, the conception of scientific understanding that I will 
adopt defines understanding in terms of grasping how to correctly explain and predict 
aspects of a given target.13 Four points are worth highlighting in this regard: First, 
                                                
11 Notable proponents of views of this sort include Kitcher (2002), Lipton (2004), Brogaard (2005), and 
Grimm (2006, 2014). In fact, Bird himself states that to understand something is “to know what causes, 
processes or laws brought it about.” (Bird 2007: 84) We will return to this comment below.  
12 Understanding has been argued to differ from knowledge in various ways, e.g. by being transparent 
(Zagzebski 2001), by being immune to Gettier problems (Kvanvig 2003, 2009; Pritchard 2009, 2010), 
and by not requiring exact truth (Elgin 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Riggs 2009; Mizrahi 2012; Strevens 2013). 
I myself argue elsewhere that understanding differs from knowledge in not requiring epistemic 
justification or belief [Author Paper]. 
13 It is common for theorists to distinguish between two different kinds of understanding, viz. objectual 
understanding and understanding-why. Objectual understanding is the kind of understanding that is 
grammatically followed by an object, as in “She understands economic depressions.” By contrast, 
understanding-why is the kind of understanding that is typically expressed using a why-clause, as in “She 
understand why economic depressions happen.” As my discussion should make clear, I will be 
concerned with objectual understanding as opposed to understanding-why. (For discussions on 
objectual understanding versus understanding-why, see Kvanvig (2009) and Khalifa (2013a).) 
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scientific understanding is clearly a matter of degree. 14  On the conception of 
understanding that I favor, a complete understanding of a given target would require 
one to grasp how to correctly explain and predict every aspect of the target. However, 
one can approach a complete understanding by grasping how to correctly explain or 
predict some aspects of the target in question. In that case, one has partial understanding 
of the target. Since my concern in this paper is primarily with increases in scientific 
understanding, which may come about even when no target is completely understood, 
I will mostly be concerned with partial as opposed to complete understanding. 
A second point worth highlighting is that while it is standard to associate 
understanding with explanation, it is less common to associate understanding with 
prediction. For example, on Michael Strevens’s ‘simple view’ of understanding, “[a]n 
individual has scientific understanding of a phenomenon just in case they grasp a 
correct scientific explanation of that phenomenon.” (Strevens 2013: 510) However, it 
seems to me that this over-intellectualizes the nature of the scientific understanding. In 
particular, a scientist who makes correct predictions about something under various 
conditions without also realizing how to explain it does seem to have at least some 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. For example, an agent has some 
understanding of the weather on a given day if she realizes how to correctly predict 
changes in the weather given a variety of different readings on her barometer.15 Thus, 
                                                
14 The gradability of understanding is emphasized by many authors, including Kvanvig (2003, 2009), 
Khalifa (2013b), Wilkenfeld (2013), and Kelp (forthcoming). 
15 Admittedly, she would not possess a complete understanding of the weather – only a partial 
understanding. A complete understanding of the weather would undoubtedly also require a grasp of 
how to explain the relevant changes in the weather. It is also worth noting that I am not claiming that a 
single correct prediction of a storm would constitute even a partial understanding of the weather. 
Instead, what is claimed here is that grasping how to correctly predict storms given a variety of different 
barometer readings would constitute a partial understanding of the weather. More generally, what is 
claimed here is not that a single correct prediction would constitute partial understanding of a target, 
but that partial understanding can consist in grasping how to predict some aspect of a target under a 
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in so far as explanation and prediction can come apart,16 I favor a conception of 
understanding on which grasping how to correctly predict some aspect of a given 
target in the right sort of circumstances counts as partially understanding it. 
A third point is that I will be following Strevens (2013: 512-513) in saying that 
an explanation can be correct even though it appeals to theories that are strictly 
speaking false, e.g. idealizations and simplifications, provided that those theories help 
identify the explanatorily relevant factors on which the explanandum depends. Of 
course, not all false theories can ground correct explanations; the distortions or 
simplifications made by such a theory must be genuinely irrelevant to the 
explanandum. For example, the ideal gas model provides for a greatly simplified 
account of some real gases by ignoring (among other things) collisions between 
molecules. However, since these collisions do not make a difference to many 
explananda, there is a class of explanations based on the ideal gas model that have the 
kind of accuracy that is required for scientific understanding. For this reason, I agree 
with authors such as Elgin (2007, 2009a, 2009b), Mizrahi (2012), and Strevens (2013) 
that understanding is quasi-factive rather than factive.17 
A final point about my conception of understanding worth elaborating on 
concerns the psychological element involved in understanding (analogous to the 
psychological attitude of belief involved in knowledge) – what I have, following several 
                                                                                                                                       
variety of different circumstances. (I will elaborate further on this point below when discussing the 
nature of grasping.) 
16 Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) famously proposed that explanation and prediction differ only with 
regard to whether the predicted or explained phenomenon had already been observed at the time. This 
‘symmetry thesis’ has now been abandoned in mainstream philosophy of science, and for good reason. 
However, as Douglas (2009) argues, there might nevertheless be a quite tight connection between 
explanation and prediction in science. 
17 The term ‘quasi-factive’ is due to Mizrahi (2012: passim). 
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other authors, referred to as ‘grasping’.18 Without a psychological element of this sort, 
understanding would not be a cognitive attitude, in which case increased 
understanding would be ineligible as an explication of cognitive progress in science (see 
section 1). But what, then, is grasping? This question does not admit of an easy 
answer.19 However, for the purposes of this paper, I will follow Grimm (2011) in 
taking grasping to be (at least extensionally equivalent to) “an ability not just to 
register how things are, but also an ability to anticipate how certain elements of the 
system would behave, were other elements different” (Grimm, 2011: 89).20 Thus, 
grasping how to explain or predict something involves not only a mental 
representation of a particular explanation or prediction, but also an associated ability 
to anticipate how to explain or predict the behavior of the same thing in somewhat 
different circumstances. Intuitively, this latter ability distinguishes someone who truly 
understands something from someone who has merely memorized the steps in a 
correct explanation or prediction of its behavior in a particular instance.21 
Keeping these four points in mind, I offer the following definition of scientific 
understanding: 
(U) An agent has partial scientific understanding of a given target just in case 
she grasps how to correctly explain and/or predict some aspects of the target 
in the right sort of circumstances. 
                                                
18 See, for example, Kvanvig (2003, 2009), Grimm (2006, 2014), Khalifa (2013c), and Strevens (2013).  
19 Indeed, as Strevens (2013: 511) notes, “[t]he question of the nature of this relation is perhaps the 
deepest in all philosophy”. 
20 See also Wilkenfeld (2013) and Hills (2015), both of whom argue that understanding involves a 
cognitive ability, e.g. to infer, explain, or mentally manipulate, which extends not just to actual 
circumstances but also to various counterfactual circumstances. 
21 This may only extensionally distinguish the person who truly understands from the person who does 
not in this sort of case, but as I indicated above I would be satisfied with an extensionally correct 
account of grasping for the purposes of this paper. 
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This seems to me to be a very natural way to conceive of the kind of understanding 
that is of relevance to the sciences. However, as noted above, I would also be happy to 
take (U) as a stipulative definition of ‘scientific understanding’ for the purposes of this 
paper. So those who disagree with me about how to explicate the intuitive or 
commonly used concept of scientific understanding may still agree with everything 
else I say in this paper. Either way, what I will argue in the rest of this paper is this: 
Science makes (cognitive) progress precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict 
more aspects of the natural world than they did before. This is the precise and canonical 
statement of the noetic account of scientific progress. Given (U) – which may either be 
taken as an explication of the commonly used concept of understanding, or as a 
stipulation for how the term will be used in the remainder of the paper – this account 
can be described more succinctly as claiming that scientific progress consists in 
increasing understanding. 
In order to see how the noetic account differs from the epistemic account, it is 
worth drawing out briefly how knowledge and understanding can come apart 
according to (U). First of all, it is clearly possible to have a substantial amount of 
knowledge about something without understanding it. For example, I may know the 
length of a flagpole’s shadow, the flagpole’s height, the position of the sun, and the 
rectilinear propagation of light, and yet fail to grasp how to explain or predict the 
length of the flagpole’s shadow, e.g. because I lack the relevant scientific or 
mathematical expertise or because I cannot be bothered to think through how such an 
explanation/prediction would proceed. In this respect, scientific understanding 
appears to be analogous to the kind of understanding one might have of an argument 
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or proof, which requires a cognitive representation of how the conclusion follows from 
the premises that goes beyond knowing that the premises and conclusion are true.22 
So, according to (U), it is possible to have knowledge about something without 
understanding it. It is also possible to understand something according to (U) without 
possessing knowledge of the relevant theories or propositions. To see why, note first of 
all that there is no requirement in (U) that an agent has epistemic justification for the 
propositions on which her understanding is based.23 More precisely, an agent may 
partially understand something by virtue of grasping how to correctly explain or 
predict some aspect of it, even though she does not have the epistemic justification 
required for knowing the propositions to which she appeals in her 
explanations/predictions. (One might object that her grasp of how to correctly explain 
or predict would give her the required justification by some sort of explanatory 
inference, but as we shall see in the next section this is not necessarily the case.) 
Indeed, there is no requirement in (U) to the effect that the agents believes that the 
relevant theories are true – she may merely assume or accept that they are true for the 
purposes of explanation and/or prediction.24 However, this latter way in which 
                                                
22 Note that it is also possible to know that some particular theory or theories can be used to correctly 
explain or predict aspects of a given target without having (partial) understanding of it. For example, I 
might come to know through reliable testimony that the length of the flagpole’s shadow can be 
explained or predicted by the flagpole’s height, the position of the sun, and the rectilinear propagation 
of light. Clearly, however, I would not thereby come to grasp how to correctly explain or predict the 
flagpole’s shadow. Thus I would not even partially understand the flagpole’s shadow according to (U) 
(assuming I had no understanding of it beforehand).  
23 Nor is there any requirement that the agent not be in a Gettier-type situation that prevents a justified 
true belief from being knowledge. 
24 I am using ‘accept’ here not in the sense of believing that a theory is empirically adequate – a sense 
often associated with van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism – but in the sense of Jonathan 
Cohen’s (1992) distinction between acceptance and belief. For Cohen, acceptance of a proposition is 
roughly a matter of treating the proposition as given in some particular context, e.g. in the context of 
explaining and predicting in science. 
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understanding is possible without knowledge will play a much less prominent role in 
the arguments that follow.25 
To sum up, I identify (partial) scientific understanding with a grasp of how to 
correctly explain and/or predict some aspects of the target in the right sort of 
circumstances. For someone to have understanding in this sense, having knowledge of 
the relevant propositions is neither necessary nor sufficient. Knowledge is not 
necessary for understanding because one can grasp how to correctly explain or predict 
something by appealing to epistemically unjustified theories (and by appealing to 
theories that one does not believe to be true). And knowledge is not sufficient for 
understanding because understanding involves a holistic cognitive state that goes 
beyond having knowledge of individual propositions. In what follows, I will exploit 
these differences between understanding and knowledge to argue that the 
understanding-based noetic account of scientific progress is superior to the knowledge-
based epistemic account. 
 
3. Progress and Understanding without Knowledge 
Given the definition of understanding presented in the previous section, there are two 
kinds of cases in which increasing understanding and accumulation of knowledge can 
come apart. The first kind of case, to be discussed in this section, is one in which one’s 
understanding of something increases even though no additional theories or 
phenomena become known in the process. In what follows I argue that the noetic 
                                                
25 See the end of section 5 for the only exception to this. 
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account correctly counts these episodes as progressive, but that the epistemic account 
cannot do so without also counting clearly non-progressive episodes as progressive. 
 The class of cases that I will be concerned with have the following structure: 
Let T be some true theory that is, for lack of epistemic justification, not known by 
some scientist or group of scientists S. Let P be some real phenomenon that is also not 
known by S to obtain or exist, for lack of epistemic justification. Now suppose S 
discovers how T explains and/or predicts P (or some aspects of P). Since, by 
stipulation, T is true and P is real, S thereby gains additional understanding of P. 
Thus the noetic account implies that there is scientific progress in cases of this sort. (As 
we shall see, this is clearly the correct verdict.) What about the epistemic account? 
Well, since P is itself unknown at the time of the discovery, the theory T that has been 
shown to explain and/or predict P need not have become known in the process. The 
same goes for P since T was unknown at the time of the discovery. So, in these cases, 
no new knowledge of either T or P is accumulated in the process of discovering how T 
explains and/or predicts P. We can further stipulate that no other theories or 
phenomena became known during the episode in question – that the only change that 
occurred during the episode was S’s discovery of how T explains and/or predicts P. If 
so, then the epistemic account appears forced to say that there would be no progress 
in cases of this sort. (We will soon see that things are a little more complicated, but not 
in a way that helps the epistemic account.) 
As a case in point, consider Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion in 
terms of the kinetic theory of heat, presented in one of his famous annus mirabilis 
papers, “Investigations on the Theory of the Brownian Movement” (1905/1956). 
Einstein’s first paragraph reads: 
 16 
In this paper it will be shown that according to the molecular-kinetic theory of 
heat, bodies of microscopically-visible size suspended in a liquid will perform 
movements of such magnitude that they can be easily observed in a 
microscope, on account of the molecular motions of heat. It is possible that the 
movements to be discussed here are identical with the so-called ‘‘Brownian 
molecular motion”; however, the information available to me regarding the 
latter is so lacking in precision, that I can form no judgment in the matter. 
(Einstein 1905/1956: 1) 
The hypothetical movements Einstein derived from the kinetic theory in the paper are 
indeed identical to the phenomenon known as ‘Brownian motion’, viz. the random 
motion of small but microscopically observable particles suspended in fluids. 
However, since Einstein’s information about Brownian motion was lacking, Einstein 
clearly did not have the epistemic justification required to know that the movements 
in question were in fact real. Thus the explanandum in Einstein’s explanation of 
Brownian motion did not constitute knowledge for Einstein at the time. 
 The same was arguably true of the explanans in 1905. The kinetic theory of 
heat was very much up for debate at the turn of the 20th century, with many physicists 
favoring alternative theories of heat that did not assume the existence of 
submicroscopic molecules. Unless one adopts very relaxed standards for the kind of 
epistemic justification required for knowledge, Einstein will not count as having 
known the kinetic theory in 1905. At any rate, we can easily imagine a world in which 
Einstein’s explanation was put forward before the kinetic theory of heat became 
sufficiently justified to be known (e.g. shortly after James Clerk Maxwell first presented 
his kinetic theory in 1859). In that case, certainly, neither the explanandum nor the 
explanans of Einstein’s explanation would have been known at the time. None of this 
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would take away from Einstein’s achievement, which was to show how Brownian 
motion is explained by the kinetic theory of heat. 
Now, it seems clear that Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion 
constituted significant (cognitive) progress in science. The noetic account explains 
why. On this account, Einstein made scientific progress because he enabled us to 
grasp how to correctly explain Brownian motion, thereby providing us with 
understanding of something that we were previously unable to understand. As I have 
set up the case, however, both the explaining theory and the explained phenomenon 
remained unknown (for lack of epistemic justification), and no additional theories or 
phenomena were introduced in the process. Thus, assuming the historical facts are as 
I have indicated (if not, we can imagine a nearby possible world in which they are) we 
appear to have here a case of scientific progress that is due to an increase in scientific 
understanding without any accumulation of scientific knowledge. 
A proponent of the epistemic account may respond to this case by either (i) 
denying that Einstein’s contribution really constitutes scientific progress, or (ii) 
insisting that Einstein’s contribution reduces to an accumulation of scientific 
knowledge after all.26 Option (i) can be ruled out almost immediately, since Einstein’s 
explanation of Brownian motion is widely considered to be one of the most significant 
                                                
26 Notice that the issue here does not depend on how one defines ‘scientific understanding’. For 
example, suppose we agree (for the sake of the argument) with Bird’s claim that “all (genuine as 
opposed to apparent) understanding is also knowledge. To understand why something occurred is to 
know what causes, processes, or laws brought it about.” (Bird, 2007: 84) Adopting this conception of 
understanding won’t help to defend the epistemic view against the current argument, since Einstein did 
not contribute to understanding in this sense. While Einstein’s explanation certainly correctly identified 
the factors that produce Brownian motion, Einstein lacked the epistemic justification required for 
knowing what causes, processes, or laws bring it about. In short, the problem here is that if we define 
understanding so that it becomes a species of knowledge, as Bird would have us do, then Einstein’s 
contribution can no longer be described as increasing understanding. As a consequence, Einstein’s 
contribution would still not count as progressive on the epistemic account. 
 18 
achievements of one of history’s greatest scientists. Denying that there is progress in 
this case is especially implausible for proponents of the epistemic account, who are 
committed to counting all instances of accumulated knowledge, however insignificant, 
as instances of scientific progress. So, to use a version of Bird’s own example, gaining 
knowledge of the number of grains of sand on a beach between two points would 
count as progress on the epistemic account (Bird 2007: 84).27 If that counts as scientific 
progress on the epistemic account, then surely Einstein’s correct explanation of 
Brownian motion in terms of the kinetic theory should also count as progress. It would 
be absurd to affirm that there is progress in the former case while denying that there is 
progress in the latter. 
This leaves us with option (ii), i.e. insisting that Einstein’s contribution to 
scientific progress reduces to an accumulation of knowledge. Since neither the 
explanans nor the explanandum of Einstein’s explanation became known during the 
episode, there appears to be only one way in which Einstein’s contribution can be 
seen as accumulating knowledge. That is, one might argue that Einstein’s contribution 
to scientific progress consisted in gaining the knowledge that the kinetic theory would 
explain Brownian motion given that the kinetic theory is true and Einstein’s description 
of Brownian motion is correct. On this suggestion, then, Einstein’s achievement 
amounts to gaining a kind of hypothetical explanatory knowledge – knowledge of how a 
potential explanans would explain a potential explanandum if the explanans and 
                                                
27 To be fair, Bird later adds that the progress in question would be “slight and insignificant” (2007: 84). 
As I will discuss in section 4 (and as Bird acknowledges), this raises the issue of what makes some 
instances of progress less significant than others – an issue that remains unresolved by Bird. More 
importantly, even if the progress here is “slight and insignificant” it would still be greater than making 
no progress at all. 
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explanandum are both true. Is this a plausible way of defending the epistemic 
account? 
  It is not. The problem is that hypothetical explanatory knowledge is far more 
common than genuine scientific progress. In fact, this is illustrated by an example that 
Bird (2007: 68-70) himself uses to argue against Laudan’s (1977, 1984) problem-
solving account of scientific progress. In the 14th century, Nicole d’Oresme and many 
of his contemporaries believed that diamonds could be split with hot goat’s blood. 
Now suppose Oresme had a radically false theory with which he managed to show 
why hot goat’s blood would split diamonds (if the theory were true). In that case, 
Oresme would have shown how his theory would explain the splitting of diamonds using 
hot goat’s blood given that his theory were true and diamonds could indeed be split in 
this way. So Oresme would have had hypothetical explanatory knowledge of the same 
kind as the response we are now considering attributes to Einstein. Thus, if the 
epistemic account says that the scientific progress made by Einstein’s contribution was 
due to hypothetical explanatory knowledge, then it would also have to count as 
progressive Oresme’s ‘explanation’ of why hot goat’s blood would split diamonds. 
Interestingly, Bird explicitly rejects this in the course of arguing against the 
problem-solving account of scientific progress: 
While such a solution [to the problem of why hot goat’s blood would split 
diamonds] might reasonably have seemed to Oresme and his contemporaries 
to be a contribution to progress it is surely mistaken to think that this is 
therefore a contribution to progress. Indeed, given that the solution would 
involve a falsehood as much as the problem itself Oresme’s alleged progress 
adds falsity to falsity. (Bird, 2007: 69) 
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I agree: Oresme’s solution to the problem of why hot goat’s blood would split 
diamonds does not constitute scientific progress. But then, I add, Einstein’s 
contribution to scientific progress when explaining Brownian motion cannot be due to 
Einstein accumulating hypothetical explanatory knowledge, since that kind of 
knowledge would have been obtained by Oresme as well. 
 The crucial difference between Einstein and Oresme is of course that Einstein 
correctly explained a real phenomenon, while Oresme only provided an apparent 
explanation of an imaginary phenomenon. For this reason, Einstein’s explanation of 
Brownian motion increased our understanding of the natural world, while Oresme’s 
solution to the alleged problem of why hot goat’s blood would split diamonds did not. 
Accordingly, on the noetic account of scientific progress, Einstein’s explanation 
constitutes progress while Oresme’s ‘explanation’ does not. This is surely the correct 
verdict. The epistemic account, by contrast, faces a crippling dilemma: If hypothetical 
explanatory knowledge does not constitute scientific progress on the epistemic 
account, then the account implies that Einstein did not contribute to scientific 
progress. If, however, hypothetical explanatory knowledge does constitute scientific 
progress on the epistemic account, then the account implies that Oresme contributed 
to scientific progress. Neither option is at all plausible. 
 
4. Progress and Knowledge without Understanding 
In the previous section I showed that there are scientifically progressive episodes in 
which scientific understanding increases while no knowledge of theories or 
phenomena is accumulated. In this section I show that there are non-progressive 
episodes in which knowledge of theories or phenomena is accumulated while there is 
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no increase in scientific understanding. These cases provide further support for my 
thesis that scientific progress is made when understanding increases as opposed to 
when knowledge accumulates. To be sure, I do not hold that accumulations of 
knowledge that do not increase understanding are necessarily scientifically irrelevant 
or unimportant. Indeed, as we shall see, I grant that such accumulations may well 
promote scientific progress. I will argue, however, that accumulations of knowledge 
which fail to increase understanding cannot constitute scientific progress. But before I 
present the argument for this, let me mention a related consideration that also counts 
in favor of the noetic account over its epistemic counterpart. 
 As Bird himself acknowledges, “[i]t is plausible to hold that that those 
additions to knowledge that are also instances of understanding are, other things being 
equal, more significant [contributions to scientific progress] than those that are not.” 
(2007: 84) Bird illustrates by considering the following example (mentioned briefly in 
the previous section): 
[…] imagine a team of researchers engaged in the process of counting, 
measuring, and classifying geologically the billions of grains of sand on a beach 
between two points. Grant that this may add to scientific knowledge. But it 
does not add much to understanding. Correspondingly it adds little to 
scientific progress. (Bird 2007: 84) 
Bird goes on to concede that the rate of progress in this example matches the rate of 
increased understanding, not the rate of accumulated knowledge. Of course, it is hard 
to see how one could measure increases in knowledge, understanding, and progress. 
Nevertheless, it does seem pre-theoretically plausible that there is a discrepancy 
between the rate of increased understanding and the rate of accumulated knowledge 
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in this case, and that intuitively the rate of scientific progress matches the former 
rather than the latter. 
 Bird does not think that the grains-of-sand case counts against the epistemic 
account, since he claims that the epistemic account “says nothing about the rate of 
progress” (2007: 84). However, since the rate of progress does not match the amount 
of accumulated knowledge, this means that some additional account would have to be 
proposed to explain the rate of progress here and elsewhere,28 thus complicating the 
otherwise simple and straightforward epistemic account of scientific progress. By 
contrast, notice that the noetic account explains the low rate of progress by appeal to 
the fact that, intuitively, investigations of grains of sand provide very little 
understanding of the world around us. They may enable us to grasp how to correctly 
explain or predict some aspects of the beach, but this understanding would not extend 
to other parts of the world or give us deep insight into the nature of something in the 
way that understanding typically does. So, while investigating grains of sand may 
provide some understanding of the beach, it clearly won’t give us anything like the 
amount of understanding provided by paradigmatic examples of scientific progress. In 
contrast to the epistemic account, the noetic account therefore neatly explains why 
some instances of scientific progress are more significant than others without adding 
any further complications to the account. This seems to me to be a weighty 
consideration in favor of the noetic account. 
 I won’t dwell on this point, however, since there is a related but more clear-cut 
case against the epistemic account and in favor of the noetic account. In brief, the 
argument is that in cases where science sees an accumulation of knowledge without 
                                                
28 Bird explicitly acknowledges this (2007: 84). 
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also seeing an increase in scientific understanding, there does not seem to be any 
scientific progress. The hardest part of making this argument is finding cases in which 
knowledge accumulates without any increase in scientific understanding. Such cases 
are admittedly rare, since most accumulations of knowledge (and, indeed, of true 
belief) will contribute at least a little bit to understanding in virtue of enabling us to 
correctly explain or predict some aspect of the natural world. Indeed, as we have 
noted, even classifications of the grains of sand on a beach may help us along a little 
bit in this regard. Nevertheless, there are at least three categories of cases in which 
knowledge is accumulated without any corresponding increase in scientific 
understanding. 
 The first category of such cases concerns random experimental outcomes. 
Suppose there is an experimental setup that is known on independent grounds to 
randomly produce one of outcomes O1 through On on a given occasion. Let us further 
suppose that there is nothing strange going on so that each time we observe some 
outcome Oi we come to know that Oi did in fact obtain in that instance. However, 
since the outcome would by stipulation be known to be completely random, this 
additional piece of knowledge would not enable us to predict any additional aspect of 
the world. It would not provide any explanatory insight either, since we knew already 
that the outcome would be random, and the fact that Oi was the outcome in a 
particular instance provides no insight into the workings of the experimental setup. 
Thus, we have that learning that Oi obtains provides no understanding whatsoever, 
and yet it gives us an additional piece of knowledge – viz. the trivial knowledge that Oi 
obtained in this instance. Intuitively, this is not a case of scientific progress. 
 Another category of cases concerns spurious statistical correlations. Suppose 
we have two variables V1 and V2 that are known on independent grounds to be 
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unrelated, causally and nomologically. Let us further suppose that we learn, i.e. come 
to know, that there is some specific statistical correlation between V1 and V2 – e.g. 
such that a greater value for V1 is correlated with a greater value for V2. There are 
many real cases of this kind. For example, it happens to be true that there is a strong 
correlation between increases in childbirth rates outside of Berlin city hospitals and 
increases in stork populations around the city. When this piece of information was 
published in a recent satirical journal article that warned against coincidental 
statistical associations (Höfer et al. 2004),29 there was an accumulation of knowledge 
that would have to count as scientific progress on the epistemic account. However, 
this information provides no understanding since it does not enable us to correctly 
explain or predict any aspect of childbirth rates or stork populations (or indeed any 
other relevant phenomenon). Intuitively, this is not a case of scientific progress. 
 A final category of cases concerns severely impoverished observational reports. 
Suppose a group of very inexperienced scientists are tasked with observing a class of 
discrete objects, e.g. the seagulls around New York City. Lacking training and further 
instructions, the scientists go out in different numbers each day to make their 
observations without registering where they went or how many scientists went on each 
trip. Worse still, they record only the time and date at which a seagull is observed. 
Thus their entire observational record consists of a list where each entry has the 
following form: “Seagull observed at [time] on [date].” Let us suppose that they did 
this very carefully and meticulously for a long period of time, so that the list constitutes 
a large number of known propositions. However, this list clearly does not underwrite 
                                                
29 The article, entitled “New Evidence for the Theory of the Stork”, came with a disclaimer warning 
against the methods used in the paper and clarifying that the paper should be read as “a humorous case 
study for education in perinatal epidemiology.” (Höfer et al. 2004: 88) 
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any explanations regarding the seagulls around New York City, nor does it enable 
correct predictions to be made on its basis. Thus we have that the scientists 
accumulated a considerable amount of knowledge, even though there was no increase 
in scientific understanding. Intuitively, there is no progress in this case. 
How might a proponent of the epistemic account respond to these cases? 
There are two options here. First, she might try to deny that there is accumulation of 
knowledge here. This response strikes me as hopeless. As I have described the cases, 
they involve discoveries of true propositions, and by stipulation there is nothing 
epistemically defective about the ways in which these truths were discovered. For 
example, the problem with the correlation between childbirth rates and stork 
population sizes is not that it fails to be true, believed, justified, or non-Gettiered (or 
that it fails to satisfy any other condition that might be required for knowledge), but 
that the correlation in question is useless for understanding the natural world. What 
makes these cases intuitively non-progressive has nothing to do with their epistemic 
merits, and everything to do with whether they can be used in particular ways in order 
to correctly explain or predict aspects of the natural world.30 
The other way to respond to the three categories of cases described above 
would be to reject the intuitions and insist that there would be some (perhaps very 
modest) scientific progress in these cases. I offer two replies: First, this does not seem 
remotely plausible unless one has in mind some extremely watered-down notion of 
scientific progress on which scientists are virtually constantly making progress. I do not 
                                                
30 Notice also that it won’t help to stipulate that only accumulations of scientific knowledge constitute 
progress, since all three categories of cases involve knowledge of the sort that is routinely obtained in 
science, viz. experimental, correlational, and observational knowledge. Thus, even if it were possible to 
distinguish between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ knowledge – which is highly doubtful – the types of 
knowledge discussed above would surely count as scientific. 
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think that this is the notion of progress that participants in the debate have thus far 
been interested in. In particular, Bird is quite clear that achieving progress should not 
be “too easy”. (2007: 83) Indeed, it is worth noting that watering-down the notion of 
scientific progress that is being explicated in this way would be an especially strange 
response for a proponent of the epistemic account, since she is committed to it being 
impossible to achieve progress without accumulation of full-blown knowledge. This 
means that true scientific theories for which we presently lack epistemic justification or 
for which we are in a Gettier-situation would not count as progressive on the 
epistemic account, no matter how much understanding such theories would provide. 
Second, and more importantly, insisting that there is scientific progress in 
these three examples conflicts with overwhelmingly plausible ideas about what makes 
for a well organized scientific practice. It is a platitude that, other things being equal, 
scientific practice should be organized around the achievement of scientific progress. 
Thus, if one allows that science can make progress by accumulating trivial pieces of 
knowledge of the sort described in the three cases above, then one must say that a 
scientific practice that is designed to accumulate trivial knowledge of this sort would, 
other things being equal, be well-organized. However, a scientific practice organized 
around accumulating trivial knowledge of this kind would seem to be a paradigm 
example of degenerate science. Note, for example, that no self-respecting scientific 
journal would publish results of this kind, except as a parody.31 Similarly, research 
proposals outlining investigations of these sorts would not be taken seriously by any 
scientific funding agency.32 
                                                
31 As in (Höfer et al. 2004). (See footnote 22.) 
32 A proponent of the epistemic account might respond to the objection presented in this paragraph by 
insisting that gaining trivial pieces of knowledge would only count as very little progress on the 
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Of course, a proponent of the epistemic account could respond to the three 
categories of cases described above by conceding that not all episodes in which 
knowledge is accumulated should count as progressive and modify her account 
accordingly. This is a sensible response, but not one that can be evaluated until we are 
told how the epistemic account will be modified. If it is stipulated that the relevant 
kind of knowledge must help us correctly explain or predict some aspect of the world – 
which is the modification that seems to be required to avoid these examples of trivial 
knowledge counting as progressive – then this amounts to conceding that science only 
makes progress when scientific understanding increases. That, however, is precisely 
what I am arguing in this section. Of course, there would still be a difference between 
the noetic account and the modified epistemic account, since the former would not 
require that our understanding be based on known propositions. But then I have 
argued in the previous section that this is not required for progress, so this modified 
epistemic account would still be inadequate. 
This concludes my argument that the noetic account of scientific progress is 
superior to the epistemic account in virtue of discounting as non-progressive various 
cases in which scientific knowledge is accumulated but scientific understanding does 
not increase. Relatedly, this section has also argued that in contrast to the epistemic 
account, the noetic account effortlessly explains why certain episodes seem to involve 
                                                                                                                                       
epistemic account. Thus, since more progress could be obtained by focusing on non-trivial knowledge, 
a scientific practice organized around accumulating trivial knowledge would not be optimal. I have two 
replies: First, note that in order for this response to work, the epistemic account must be supplemented 
with an account of how much progress is contributed by each kind of knowledge, and no such account 
is forthcoming. Second, and more importantly, this response does not fully deal with the problem since 
it still allows that there are cases in which the progress provided by the accumulation of non-trivial 
knowledge would be greater than the progress provided by the accumulation of a sufficiently large 
amount of trivial knowledge that could be obtained just as easily, in which case an optimal scientific 
practice would be organized around gaining the large amount of trivial knowledge. This consequence 
of the (modified) epistemic account is still clearly unacceptable. 
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very little progress even though a significant amount of knowledge is accumulated. 
Together with the argument of the previous section, these points already constitute a 
strong case for the noetic account over its epistemic counterpart. To further 
strengthen this case, I will now consider two objections on behalf of the epistemic 
account – one of which argues that increased understanding is not necessary for 
progress; the other that increased understanding is not sufficient for progress. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
Objection 1: Not all discoveries that fail to increase understanding are examples of 
trivial pieces of knowledge like those discussed in the previous section. In particular, a 
scientist may collect some raw data that gives her no additional understanding at 
present, e.g. because there simply is not enough data to indicate how to correctly 
explain or predict anything on that basis. While collecting such raw data may not 
revolutionize science, it is surely quite valuable in many cases. Indeed, since collecting 
data is itself essential to achieving scientific understanding at a later point, it can be 
described as ‘a step in the right direction’. So why not count such episodes in which 
raw data is collected as scientifically progressive? 
 Reply: I agree that collecting raw data that does not by itself increase 
understanding is often valuable for the achievement of scientific progress, but I resist 
the implication that collecting such data should count as scientific progress. As noted 
in section 1, it is possible for something to promote scientific progress without constituting 
such progress. Accordingly, I would characterize the collection of data that does not 
by itself enable us to explain or predict anything (but puts us in a position to do so in 
the future) as promoting rather than constituting scientific progress. Clearly, 
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promoting scientific progress is valuable for the purposes of scientific progress. Thus, 
on my view, collecting raw data is often valuable for the purposes of achieving 
scientific progress even when this does not by itself constitute scientific progress. 
Having said this, I would not much mind if the noetic account were modified 
so as to allow data-collection of this kind to count as scientifically progressive. Suppose 
we said that science makes progress just in case it either increases, or promotes the increase of, 
scientific understanding. On this modified noetic account, collecting raw data would 
count as progressive as long as it promotes an increase in scientific understanding. My 
reason for preferring the simpler account on which science makes progress precisely 
when there is increased scientific understanding is that is that it seems to make perfect 
sense to say that something promotes progress. However, if promoting increased 
understanding is itself a kind of scientific progress, then promoting scientific progress 
may amount to promoting the promotion of increased understanding. I prefer to 
avoid this conceptually awkward situation by keeping the concept of promotion 
distinct from the concept of progress. Those who disagree and prefer to modify the 
noetic account such that the promotion of increased understanding counts as a kind of 
progress are welcome to do so. 
 Objection 2: In stark contrast to my argument in section 3, Bird (2007: 65-67) 
argues directly that epistemic justification is necessary for scientific progress. Bird’s 
argument is that, intuitively, the accumulation of true but unjustified beliefs does not 
constitute scientific progress. For example, the French scientist Réné Blondlot appears 
to have believed in the existence of what he called ‘N-rays’ (analogous to X-rays) 
without having any real evidence for his theory other than subjective observations 
(which were known to be highly unreliable in the circumstances). If we now suppose 
that there are in fact such things as N-rays, Bird claims that it nevertheless seems 
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intuitively wrong to attribute scientific progress to Blondlot’s discovery. Bird concludes 
from this that accumulating true or truthlike beliefs is not sufficient for progress 
because such beliefs may fail to be justified. Since I do not take justification to be 
required for understanding, the same argument would seem to apply to my 
understanding-based noetic account of scientific progress. 
 Reply: Bird’s argument has been criticized on various grounds by Cevolani and 
Tambolo (2013), Niiniluoto (2014), and Rowbottom (2008, 2010, 2015). While I think 
that these criticisms are on the right track, I’ll develop my own response in a different 
way. Since Bird’s argument rests on an intuition about when scientific progress is 
made, I will start by clarifying what the relevant intuition would have to be for Bird’s 
argument to succeed against the noetic account. I then go on to suggest that this 
intuition ought to be rejected. I will also argue that the intuition in question only 
appears plausible if one confuses scientific progress tout court with scientific progress 
achieved by epistemically agreeable means. 
In order for Blondlot’s discovery to constitute progress in Bird’s example, 
Blondlot’s theory of N-rays (which are assumed to exist in this scenario) would have to 
have been sufficiently true to the actual facts to enable Blondlot to correctly explain or 
predict some real phenomena with the theory. Since N-rays do not in fact exist, it is 
somewhat difficult to imagine what the corresponding explanations and predictions 
would be, but note that they would have to be correct. So let’s suppose, for example, 
that Blondlot’s N-ray theory offered a correct explanation of why some materials emit 
light of a certain wavelength when heated to a specific point. In that case, is it so 
obvious that Blondlot’s discovery (which was a discovery in this fictional case) is 
intuitively not a case of scientific progress? Granted that Blondlot would be behaving 
in an epistemically objectionable manner if he believed his theory on the basis of 
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insufficient evidence (a point to which we will return), I see no reason why we should 
conclude that Blondlot would not have contributed to scientific progress in this 
fictional case.33 
 To bolster this response, let me emphasize that the N-ray example is a piece of 
historical fiction. In reality, Blondlot’s N-ray theory does not provide us with scientific 
understanding since there are no such things as N-rays. Let us therefore consider a 
more realistic case in which a true theory is used as the basis for explanations and/or 
predictions even though scientists lacked the epistemic justification required for 
knowing that the theory is true. For example, Bird (2007: 67) claims that Alfred 
Wegener’s theory of continental drift was not supported by sufficient evidence for the 
theory to be known until long after Wegener first proposed it in 1910. So, according 
to Bird’s epistemic account, Wegener’s theory would not have constituted progress 
even if it had it become accepted at the time. On the noetic account, however, 
acceptance of Wegener’s theory would have constituted progress since it would have 
enabled scientists to grasp how to correctly explain various aspects of the Earth’s 
geological history and perhaps even predict its future trajectory. In this more realistic 
case, it seems to me that intuition is decisively on the side of the noetic account. 
 So I reject the alleged intuitions that are meant to support the claim that 
epistemic justification is required for scientific progress. When the fictional N-ray 
example has been properly specified so as to make clear that the discovery increases 
scientific understanding, I submit that it is a case of scientific progress. This is even 
clearer in the case of Wegener’s theory of continental drift, where there would clearly 
                                                
33 As Rowbottom (2015: 103) points out, a recent empirical survey soliciting folk intuitions about 
scientific progress (Mizrahi and Buckwalter 2014) does not support Bird’s premise that, intuitively, 
justification is necessary for progress. 
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be progress even though the epistemic justification for the theory is (by Bird’s own 
lights) not sufficient for knowledge. That being said, I do concede that there is 
something amiss in both cases, which may ultimately be responsible for why Bird’s 
argument has some initial appeal. I will therefore supplement my response to Bird’s 
argument by outlining an error-theoretic explanation for Bird’s intuition that scientific 
progress cannot be made in the absence of epistemic justification. 
 I start with the observation that Blondlot’s discovery would have involved 
epistemically objectionable behavior. Now, it is certainly understandable that we 
would hesitate to attribute progress in cases of that sort, just as we might hesitate to 
attribute progress in any other case where progress towards some end is made by 
means of which we disapprove. For example, consider an athlete that makes progress 
towards her goal of running 100 meters in less than 10 seconds by using performance-
enhancing drugs that permanently improve her best time by a whole second. Does 
such an athlete make progress towards her goal of running 100 meters in 10 seconds? 
Upon reflection, the answer is clearly ‘yes’, since she would indeed run the 100 meters 
faster than before. However, we might initially hesitate to attribute progress to this 
athlete because we disapprove of the manner in which progress was made. The key 
point here is that we hold athletes to certain standards, and it may initially seem 
paradoxical that a given athlete can be said to have made progress when she fails to 
live up to those standards. 
 Analogously, we hold each other (and especially scientists) to certain standards 
of epistemic justification. In particular, we disapprove of those who form beliefs on the 
basis of insufficient evidence, even when those beliefs turn out to be true. We therefore 
rightly disapprove of Blondlot’s stubborn belief that there are N-rays, formed as it was 
on the basis of dubious evidence. This means that Blondlot’s discovery is not 
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praiseworthy in the same way as most other episodes of scientific progress. But to 
conclude that Blondlot’s discovery in the fictional case did not constitute progress at 
all is to confuse scientific progress tout court with scientific progress made by 
epistemically agreeable means. While there are good reasons to disapprove of the 
practices that led to Blondlot’s discovery, it does not follow that this (fictional) episode 
should not be counted as progressive at all. Similarly, while we may prefer for 
Wegener to have refrained from believing the theory of continental drift until more 
conclusive evidence had been obtained, it does not follow that Wegener’s discovery in 
1910 should not be regarded as progressive in that case. Rather, it is most natural to 
describe Wegener’s contribution as an instance of scientific progress made on the basis 
of somewhat insufficient or incomplete evidence. 
This error-theoretic explanation for the initial appeal of Bird’s intuition also 
explains why we don’t have a similar reaction in the case of Einstein’s explanation of 
Brownian motion. In Einstein’s case, there is nothing to suggest that Einstein himself 
formed any belief based on insufficient evidence because there is no reason to think 
that Einstein had any firm beliefs about either the kinetic theory or his derived 
description of Brownian motion. Einstein simply never commits to either the kinetic 
theory or to any particular description of Brownian motion in his 1905 paper. What 
he did was to show how to explain Brownian motion with the kinetic theory, and for 
this purpose there was no need to affirm or deny either the explaining theory or the 
explained phenomenon. So my error-theoretic explanation of the initial appeal of 
Bird’s argument correctly implies that we should be less hesitant to attribute progress 
to Einstein’s achievement than to Blondlot’s discovery in Bird’s fictional case. 
 
 34 
6. Further Advantages 
So far I have argued that cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart in 
science indicate that scientific progress matches increases in scientific understanding 
rather than accumulations of scientific knowledge. These cases provide a 
straightforward case for the noetic account over its epistemic counterpart, but there 
are other advantages of the noetic account as well. In this final section, I will suggest 
that the noetic account is better equipped to deal with considerations having to do 
with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value. To be clear, 
none of these considerations are meant to constitute conclusive arguments against the 
epistemic account. In each case, there are ways for the proponent of the epistemic 
account to reply or modify her position so as to avoid the problem in question – ways 
that I lack space to explore here. However, the ease with which the noetic account 
deals with these problems further suggests that the noetic account is an improvement 
on the epistemic account. 
 The first additional advantage of the noetic account over the epistemic 
account concerns the role of idealizations in scientific explanations. In particular, 
consider the kind of idealizations that Michael Weisberg (2007: 642-645) calls 
minimalist idealizations. A minimalist idealization is a model that contains the core causal 
claims that make a difference to a given phenomenon under investigation, but also 
eliminates or exaggerates explanatorily irrelevant factors in order to illuminate aspects 
of reality that would otherwise be obscured by their complexity. Consider, for 
example, the fact that many current population models in evolutionary biology (e.g. 
the Hardy-Weinberg Law) assume that populations are infinitely large in their 
explanations of biological phenomena such as the fixation of phenotypic traits. Since 
the purpose of minimalist idealization is to facilitate scientific explanation by isolating 
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explanatorily relevant factors, such idealizations may be useful even then more 
accurate, non-idealized theories are available. As Weisberg notes, this means that 
unlike some other kinds of idealizations, “minimalist idealization is not at all 
pragmatic and we should not expect it to abate with the progress of science.” 
(Weisberg, 2007: 645) 
By definition, minimalist idealizations are not true. However, as noted 
above,34 this does not mean that explanations based on minimalist idealizations are 
not correct. As long as such minimalist idealizations help identify the factors that are 
explanatorily relevant to the explained phenomenon, they have the kind of accuracy 
required for the associated explanations to undergird scientific understanding. So the 
noetic account (correctly) implies that scientific progress can be made by generating 
new minimalist idealizations (and, relatedly, that abandoning such idealizations may 
regress science) even when non-idealized versions of these theories are available. By 
contrast, since idealized theories are not true, the epistemic account (incorrectly) 
implies that no progress is made when one generates minimalist idealizations, at least 
not when more accurate, non-idealized theories are available. Relatedly, the epistemic 
account also (incorrectly) implies that minimalist idealizations ought to abate as 
science progresses, since there would be no point in having idealized theories from a 
purely epistemic point of view when non-idealized versions of these theories have been 
made available. 
 A related advantage of the noetic account concerns pragmatic virtues. By 
‘pragmatic virtues’ I am referring to features of a theory that are not presumed to 
make the theory any likelier to be true, but instead make the theory easier to 
                                                
34 See section 2. 
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conceptualize or utilize for some purposes. Arguably, the simplicity with which a 
theory is formulated (theoretical simplicity) is a pragmatic virtue in this sense, at least 
when distinguished from parsimony in the number of entities or causes postulated by 
the theory (ontological simplicity). Now, suppose we have a choice between accepting 
one of two equivalent theories, T1 and T2, which differ only in the way the theories 
are formulated, e.g. in that T1 has greater theoretical simplicity than T2. Scientific 
practice (and common sense) suggests that T1 should be preferred to T2. But why? 
Given that T1 and T2 are equivalent, why should one accept the simpler T1 rather 
than the more complex T2? 
 On the noetic account, the answer is straightforward. A simple theory enables 
us to explain and predict aspects of the world that would be more difficult or even 
impossible to explain and predict with a more complex theory. So, even though T1 
and T2 are equivalent, the simpler T1 would provide us with more understanding than 
the more complex T2, and thus make a greater contribution to scientific progress. By 
contrast, the epistemic account implies that the progress contributed by each theory is 
exactly the same. After all, the propositional content of the two theories is identical, so 
the amount of knowledge gained by coming to know T1 is (by any measure) exactly 
the same as the amount of knowledge gained by coming to know T2. Thus, in contrast 
to the noetic account, the epistemic account does not account for the scientific 
preference for theories that possess pragmatic virtues such as theoretical simplicity. 
A third and final advantage of the noetic account over the epistemic account 
concerns the relationship between epistemic value and scientific progress. In recent 
years, a number of epistemologists have come to question the idea that knowledge has 
any distinctive epistemic value (see, e.g., Kaplan 1985; Kvanvig 2003, 2009; Pritchard 
2009, 2010; BonJour 2010). In brief, the problem – first discussed in Plato’s Meno and 
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thus often known as ‘the Meno Problem’ – is that it is unclear why knowledge is more 
valuable than weaker epistemic standings such as true and/or justified belief. 
Discussions of this problem often point out that there is no similar problem about how 
to account for the distinctive value of understanding, which suggests that 
understanding is a more valuable epistemic standing than knowledge. Indeed, partly 
for this reason, it has been argued that understanding should replace knowledge as the 
primary focus of epistemological theorizing (see, e.g., Zagzebski 2001; Kvanvig 2003, 
2009; Elgin 2006; Pritchard 2009, 2010; see also Grimm 2012). 
If understanding but not knowledge is distinctively valuable, as the recent 
literature on the Meno Problem suggests, then this provides a further consideration in 
favor of the noetic account over the epistemic account. To see why, recall that the 
epistemic and noetic accounts translate into distinct theses about the aim of science, 
viz. the theses that that science aims for knowledge and understanding respectively.35 
Now, if knowledge has no distinctive value, then it is unclear why science (or any other 
cognitive enterprise) should be aiming for knowledge as opposed to the weaker 
epistemic standing that is distinctively valuable. So the Meno Problem is a problem for 
a knowledge-based view of the aim of science, and thus by implication also a problem 
for the epistemic account of scientific progress. By contrast, since there is no similar 
problem about the distinctive value of understanding, there is no difficulty involved in 
explaining why science would aim to achieve understanding. In sum, then, the Meno 
Problem for knowledge and the lack of a corresponding problem for understanding 
constitutes a further reason to favor the noetic account over its epistemic counterpart. 
                                                




The idea that science makes progress by accumulating knowledge is prima facie 
plausible. However, the initial appeal of this idea may be due to the fact that 
knowledge has not always been clearly distinguished from understanding. When we 
take care to distinguish these two cognitive states, it starts to seem less obvious that 
knowledge rather than understanding is what increases when science makes cognitive 
progress. In order to settle this issue, I have considered cases in which knowledge and 
understanding come apart. It has been shown that in these cases, scientific progress 
follows increases in scientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. 
In addition, I have argued that considerations having to do with minimalist 
idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor the understanding-based 
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